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National Intelligence Daily

Thursday 8 March 1984

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
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IRAN-IRAQ: Iranians Halt Iraqi Counterattack	
Iran appears to have stopped Iraq's counterattack on the Majnoon Islands.	25 X 1
US diplomats in Baghdad say that a senior Iraqi diplomat agreed yesterday with their assessment that Iraq's efforts to retake the Majnoon oilfields are in trouble.	25 X
wajnoon oineius are in trouble.	25X
	25 X ′
	25X ²
Comment: If Iran completes the pontoon bridge, it will be able to move artillery and probably armored vehicles onto the island quickly.	25X1
attacks against Iraqi cities are likely to resume when Tehran launches its main offensive against Al Basrah. Iran cannot sustain large-scale air attacks, but it could increase its artillery shelling of Iraqi border areas.	25X1
Leading Iranian clerics anticipate a military victory over Iraq, and hey want to strengthen control over the Iraqi exile movement. They also are dissatisfied with the Council's failure to rally Iraqi Shias against President Saddam Husayn. Tehran would like to control Iraq's	0574
povernment if it wins the war, but many of the Iraqi opposition leaders object to the creation of a puppet government in Baghdad.	25X1
a poppor government in bagnidad.	25 X 1

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IRAQ-US: Strained Relations


Baghdad is reacting angrily to the US condemnation of its use of chemical agents and probably is nervous about what it views as a slackening of US support in other areas.	25X1
	25X
President Saddam Husayn has publicly accused the US of trying to gain favor with Iran.	25X1
Diplomatic sources in Amman say the US Export-Import Bank has decided not to join the funding of an Iraqi oil pipeline through Jordan, a project in which Japanese, French, West German, and British banks are participating. The Iraqis reportedly have emphasized the importance of US involvement.	25X1
	25X1
Comment: The Iraqis almost certainly will believe that these setbacks are part of an effort by the US to prolong the war. They have claimed repeatedly that both the US and the USSR want the fighting to continue, in order to weaken both belligerents.	25 X 1
As long as the war continues, Baghdad cannot afford a complete break in its relations with the US. Nonetheless, the recent incidents will strengthen the position of those Iraqi leaders who are suspicious	25X1
of the US and will delay any resumption of full diplomatic ties.	25 X ′

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USSR-US-PERSIAN GULF: Soviet Protest	
The TASS statement issued yesterday denouncing US naval activity in the Persian Gulf apparently is intended to blame the US for the increasing tension in the region.	25X1
The statement accused the US of "gross violation" of international law and warned that the USSR would not recognize US-imposed restrictions on air and sea traffic. It stated that Washington—in claiming the Gulf is an area vital to US interests—is endangering lives and property and is provoking "a conflict situation" for which it would have to bear full responsibility.	25X1
Pravda has reported that the Politburo at its meeting last week accused the US of increasing tensions in the Indian Ocean region. Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko told the French Ambassador that this meant that the US should not meddle in the Gulf. The Soviets also are urging representatives of Indian Ocean littoral states at the UN to support a resolution affirming freedom of navigation in the Arabian Sea and criticizing recent US activity in the region.	25X1
Comment : The TASS statement appears designed to portray the USSR as a champion of freedom of navigation, without antagonizing either Iraq or Iran. It carefully avoids mentioning either country or the war. Moscow probably is trying to capitalize on the recent press reports that US ships fired warning shots at Iranian planes and ships.	25X1
The timing of the statement—one day after the issuance of the report of the International Civil Aviation Organization on the shootdown of the South Korean airliner—and the citing of relevant civil air agreements suggest that Moscow may be trying to offset new adverse publicity. The Soviets may now issue a formal demarche to the US, similar to their protest in January on US naval and air activity in the eastern Mediterranean. Despite these public expressions of concern, there has been no unusual Soviet naval activity in the area	25 X 1

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Kilometers

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Congo

Gabon

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NIGERIA: Implications of Religious Rioting	
The Army has restored order in the northeastern State of Gongola following more than a week of rioting by a small Islamic fringe group, but rumors of more outbreaks in other northern cities are forcing military governors to take precautions.	25 X 1
The latest violence—the fourth clash since 1979 between security forces and the outlawed Maitatsine sect—was provoked when undermanned police tried to arrest members of the group and were forced to call in the Army. The Maitatsine are hostile to all authority, including that exercised by fundamentalists and traditional Muslims, whom they regard as nonbelievers.	25 X 1
The sect's estimated 10,000 members are organized into communal cells and lead an underground existence in nearly every major northern city. It continues to recruit heavily among poorly educated youths who migrate to the cities.	25X1
There are no reports of foreign involvement with the Maitatsine or in the latest disturbances. Libya and Iran, however, have gained limited influence with some other northern Nigerian Muslim groups by offering them money and training. Saudi Arabia also has supported more mainline progovernment Muslim groups.	25 X 1
Comment : The rioting comes at a time of deteriorating economic conditions. Head of State Buhari cannot afford to appear weak and vacillating and will use whatever force he believes necessary to prevent more disturbances.	25X1
Additional religious ferment in the north could offer new opportunities for splinter groups to gain outside support and influence far beyond their numerical strength. Any appearance of faltering government control also could serve as a pretext for a coup attempt by middle- or junior-level officers. Many of them already are	

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upset about the government's slowness in effecting economic

recovery and punishing former civilian politicians



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ETHIOPIA-SUDAN: Continuing Tension	
The deep mistrust between Addis Ababa and Khartoum does not improve prospects for mediation in talks sponsored by Egypt that are scheduled to take place in Nairobi later this month.	25X1
The US Embassy in Addis Ababa reports that Ethiopia holds Sudan responsible for the increase in insurgent activity in its northern provinces of Eritrea and Tigray during the past year.	25X1
	25X1
Comment: Although both sides have agreed to participate in Egypt's mediation effort, neither Addis Ababa nor Khartoum appears willing or able to take the steps that are necessary to ease tensions.	
They persist in blaming their problems largely on external factors, rather than focusing on domestic policies that would help reduce dissidence.	25X1
Ethiopia views Sudan's efforts at reconciliation as duplicitous because Khartoum is continuing to allow Eritrean and Tigrean insurgents to use Sudan as a logistic base. Nimeiri has little control	
over the Eritrean dissidents, however, and he has failed in several attempts to restrict their operations.	25 X 1
Mengistu's frustration about the insurgencies in the northern provinces will reinforce his commitment to support the Sudanese dissidents.	25 X 1
	25X1

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
tized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25 : CIA-RDP87T00970R00010003003 Top Secret	26-1 25X1
EL SALVADOR: Military Activity	
Government forces are increasing pressure on the guerrillas in eastern and central areas of the country.	25 X
The US defense attache reports that over the weekend an immediate reaction battalion attacked guerrilla forces near Ciudad Barrios in San Miguel Department. The unit claims it killed 60 guerrillas and captured 40 weapons in the fighting.	25>
	25
The Army is conducting sweep operations in southeastern and southwestern Usulutan Department. Fighting continues in the Guazapa area in Cuscatlan.	25X
Meanwhile the Coneral Stoff has warmed with the bank of	25
Meanwhile, the General Staff has warned units to be alert for accelerated guerrilla activity in the San Salvador area through the election period. The US Embassy reports an increase in terrorist incidents in the capital since 1 March	25X
incidents in the capital since 1 March.	25)


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Comment: The Army's operations are intended to seize the tactical initiative, disrupt insurgent concentrations and logistic networks, and prevent the guerrillas from upsetting the election process. The insurgents have been largely successful in avoiding major government sweeps, however, and they probably are preparing

to intensify their own military operations as the election nears.





Greek and Turkish Forces in Cyprus

Greek Forces		Turkish Forces		
Cypriot National Guard	10,000 - 11,000 650 seconded Greek officers	Turkish Cypriot Security Force	5,000 400 seconded Turkish regulars and NCO's	
Greek Army regulars	1,900	Turkish Army regulars	23,000-27,000	
-				25X

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	25X1
GREECE-TURKEY-CYPRUS: Possible Greek Reinforcements	
There is widespread speculation in Cyprus, Turkey, and Greece	
about an impending deployment of Greek troops to the island.	25X1
	25X1
Prime Minister Papandreou is encouraging a reluctant Cypriot President Kyprianou to accept additional troops to strengthen the 2,000-man Greek garrison.	
2,000 man Grook garrison.	
	25X1
Turkish and Turkish Cypriot leaders have issued harsh warnings recently about the consequences if Greece were to send more troops to the island.	 25X1
	25 X 1
	23/1
	25X1
Turkey would be likely to respond with more troops of its own. Such a move would greatly heighten tensions and increase	
the possibility of hostilities.	25 X 1

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WEST GERMANY-EAST GERMANY: Increasing Contacts

The recent meeting in Moscow between Chancellor Kohl and East German leader Honecker seems to have given new momentum to bilateral relations.	25X1
Press reports state that East German Politburo member Mittag will meet with Kohl early next month during a visit to the trade fair in Hannover, and Bavarian leader Strauss may talk with Honecker next week at the trade fair in Leipzig, East Germany. In addition, West German opposition leader Vogel will meet with Honecker next week.	25 X 1
Bonn and East Berlin resumed negotiations on Monday on a bilateral cultural agreement. The talks had lapsed after INF deployments began. The US Embassy in East Berlin reports that Honecker recently hinted that he would take up an invitation to visit West Germany.	25X1
Meanwhile, the press also is reporting that East Germany continues to allow emigration at the fastest rate since the Berlin Wall was constructed. About 2,000 people have emigrated in the last three weeks, as compared with about 1,000 per month in late 1983.	25X′ 25X1
Between 20,000 and 30,000 people could be released over the next several months, according to the Embassy. West Germany makes periodic payments to East Germany for allowing emigration.	25X ⁻
Comment: East Berlin's cooperative attitude may reflect confidence in Honecker's rapport with General Secretary Chernenko. Now that enough time has elapsed since INF deployments began, East Germany also probably believes it risks no serious loss in credibility by seeking better relations with West Germany.	25X1
East German leaders are likely to hope that easing restrictions on emigration will rid them of many dissidents. They also probably calculate that this apparent liberalization—even if temporary—will square accounts with Bonn for its \$400 million loan guarantee last summer. Moreover, East Germany may be trying to lay the groundwork for obtaining more economic help from Bonn, even	057/
though it is unlikely to have an immediate need for another major loan.	25 X 1

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
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Comment: The suspension probably is intended as a sharp reminder that Angola has to make a greater effort to enforce the disengagement agreement. Although the South Africans recognize that the Angolans cannot completely control SWAPO infiltration, they clearly believe that the Angolans are doing far less than they can to make disengagement work. Pretoria is likely to view Luanda's response as a measure of Angola's commitment to the peace process. The movement of the mechanized unit away from the border indicates that Pretoria is not now preparing to move back into Angola.

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
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ITALY HOOD N	
ITALY-USSR: New Gas Purchases Approv	
Rome has given the state energy firm to negotiate new gas purchases from the USS	R. Government officials
say there are no political obstacles to a resu with the Soviets for new gas purchases. A s	ource of the US Embassy
reports that any agreement to purchase add probably would be for between 2 billion and	4 billion cubic meters
annually, rather than the 8 billion in the orig	
Comment : Italy does not need additional 1990s. The Italians, however, see themselve	s in a good position in
the current buyers' market to play off the Se eventually the Algerians to extract concession	ons on prices and
minimum purchase requirements. Rome pro Soviet trade concessions, however, in order	to help ease its trade
deficit of over \$1 billion. It also is likely to ta prices, especially in view of the energy firm's	ke a tough position on s losses of about
\$1 billion in 1983.	
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Special Analysis

USSR-EAST GERMANY: Soviet Logistic Buildup

OSSH-EAST GERMANT: Soviet Logistic Buildup	
The USSR has substantially expanded its military logistic structure in Central Europe since the mid-1970s. The Soviets now have enough combat supplies in East Germany to support more than twice their current force there in the initial phase of a campaign against NATO. The large stockpile gives them greater flexibility in the use of supply lines to the USSR and much greater ability to sustain operations if NATO severely damages those lines. The Soviets, however, still would need to move in troops to fill out rear service units in East Germany.	25X1
Soviet military writings,	25X1 25X1
indicate that the Soviets have provided the key support services to their troops in East Germany far beyond the norms for forces of such size. These categories include ammunition and fuel, medical service, and equipment repair. Most growth occurred after 1976 through systematic construction and expansion.	25 X 1
During the past decade in East Germany, the Soviets have:	
 Built seven new front-level fuel depots and expanded the other 34. 	
 Constructed seven front-level ammunition depots and expanded the other nine. 	
 Doubled the equipment available to form mobile equipment-repair units. 	
 Increased their mobile field hospital sets from 37 to 65. 	
 Modernized motor transport units with new trucks built with Western technology and established a reserve of as many as 12,000 older trucks. 	25X1
At the same time, the Soviets have modernized and expanded their combat units. This created a need for some increase in stocks to serve the additional artillery and motorized rifle units in the Soviet forces. The logistic buildup, however, has outstripped the pace of combat increases.	25X1
continued	

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		25 X 1
Advantages to the Soviets		
The systematic investment in service support reduneed to encumber their lines of communication before bulky, vulnerable supplies. This will facilitate the rapid	e hostilities with	25X1
the forward area from the USSR.		23/1
The Soviets now have the flexibility to sustain ope Group of Soviet Forces in Germany even if supply line	erations by the	
some stocks were destroyed early in a conflict. In add	lition, the USSR	
could use stocks already in Eastern Europe to supply strategic echelon units that were moved from the wes	second tern USSR to	
reinforce or exploit initial successes by the Warsaw Pa	act.	25 X ′
Remaining Weaknesses		
Warning indicators associated with the movement	t forward of	
logistic supplies from the USSR before a conflict could	d be reduced.	
but not eliminated. Many Soviet service support units manpower assigned to them in peacetime, and at leas	nave no st 100.000	
personnel would be needed to staff them. Approximat	tely 40,000	25 X 1
troops would be needed to bring combat units to full	strength.	25/1
These troops could be moved quickly to the forward	ard area in a	
crisis. There could be some initial confusion, however, had never trained as such were filled out and as suppli	, as units which	
from depots to combat units. Moreover, stocks not ra	pidly removed	
from facilities at the outbreak of hostilities would be viattack.	ulnerable to	25 X 1
Most of the new facilities are concentrated south of	of Berlin. Thev	
are thus not positioned to support Warsaw Pact force	s that would	
operate in northern East Germany. These forces may resupply from Poland or the USSR	still require	25X1

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resupply from Poland or the USSR.

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